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DRONENBURG V. ZECH: FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS AND THE MILITARY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Dronenburg v. Zech, l the United States Court of Ap-
peals, District of Columbia Circuit, upheld the discharge of a 
Navy Petty Officer on the grounds that he had engaged in homo-
sexual relations while a member of the service.2 The initial basis 
for the discharge was Instruction 1900.9C,3 promulgated by the 
Secretary of the Navy, which provided for the "separation" from 
the naval service of any member who "solicits, attempts, or en-
gages in homosexual acts."4 
In reaching its decision, the court held that the Navy had 
not violated Dronenburg's constitutional rights to privacy and 
equal protection of the laws. I) The court also concluded that the 
Navy's policy of discharging homosexual members was rationally 
related to a permissible objectiveS and, in a larger context, that 
1. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
2. [d. at 1398. 
3. SEC/NA V Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216, quoted in 
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. 
4. [d. at 1389. 
5. [d. at 1391. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Aside from the right to equal protection expressly guaranteed by the amendment, the 
right to privacy is also found in the due process clause contained within it. See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
6. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. The Supreme Court uses the deferential "rational 
basis" test when reviewing legislation challenged under the due process or equal protec-
tion clauses of the Constitution. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 
(1955). In that case, the Court upheld the state regulation of opticians based upon a 
finding that the legislature enacting the law in question might have had any number of 
rational reasons for adopting the challenged restrictions. [d. at 487-88. 
The more stringent "strict scrutiny" test, which demands that the state have a com-
pelling interest in the object of the legislation and that the legislation be drawn as nar-
rowly as possible, is used when the legislation under review abridges or impairs constitu-
tional rights or other fundamental guarantees. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). There the Court struck down a state abortion statute which prohibited abortions 
(except in certain cases) at all stages of pregnancy, based on considerations of maternal 
and fetal safety. [d. at 150. In Roe, the Court found those considerations not sufficiently 
531 
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there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual rela-
tions.7 The broad dicta in Dronenburg and the fact that the 
court disposed of the appeal on general constitutional grounds 
applicable in a civil context makes the opinion of the court of 
more than passing interest to civilians. This Note will discuss 
some of the implications for both servicepeople and civilians 
arising out of Dronenburg and its forebears. 
II. HOMOSEXUALS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMED 
FORCES - A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Despite its acceptance in the armed forces of many other 
nations,S homosexuality has never been accepted in the Ameri-
can military.9 The military attitudes regarding homosexual rela-
tions have traditionally mirrored the attitudes of society at 
large,t° with the penalties for such "crimes against nature" in-
cluding expulsion from the service and even prison terms.ll This 
approach is in sharp contrast to many other nations, whose 
armed forces have no specific prohibitions against 
compelling during the first trimester of pregnancy to justify the infringement of the con-
stitutional.~ight to privacy. Id. at 155. 
7. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397. 
8. See McCrary & Gutierrez, The Homosexual Person in the Military and in Na-
tional Security Employment, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW 115-46 (D. Knutson ed. 
1980). Among the nations which do not specifically ban homosexuals from the military 
are Japan; Spain, Italy, and the Philippines. Id. at 116. 
9. Id. 'See also Bourdonnay, Military and Veterans, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
THE LAW 6-3 to -4 (R. Achtenberg ed. 1985). Katherine A. Bourdonnay is an attorney in 
private practice in Seattle, specializing in military law. She is chairperson of the Draft 
Committee of ACLU-Washington and former Director of Military Counseling at the San 
Diego Gay Center. Her Article contains much valuable information for gay people in the 
armed forces or other governmental employment regarding rights and remedies. 
10. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-3 to -4. Bourdonnay relates that one of George 
Washington's officers, Lt. Frederick Gotthold Enslin, was court-martialed for attempted 
sodomy. Upon conviction, he was ordered drummed out of camp by "all the Drummers 
and Fifers in the Army never to return." Id. General Washington approved Enslin's "dis-
charge" "with Abhorrence and Detestation of Such Infamous crimes .... " Id. 
11. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 116. "From time to time throughout 
United States military history, there have also been pogroms to rid the services of any 
homosexual person who had escaped initial detection." Id. See also Bourdonnay, supra 
note 9, at 6-4. Throughout the Forties and Fifties, servicemembers accused of being gay 
were frequently threatened with court-martial in order to gain their acquiesence to dis-
charge. Id. Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice permits punishment "as a 
court-martial may direct" for a conviction of the crime of "unnatural carnal copulation 
with another person of the same or opposite sex." 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1975). The sentence 
for consensual sodomy where the participants are over 16 years of age cannot exceed five 
years at hard labor. Id. § 856. 
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homosexuals. 12 
Generally, the various branches of the United States armed 
forces have promulgated and enforced their own separate regula-
tions regarding homosexuals, on a branch-wide basis.13 Staff in 
all branches have sought and continue to seek to exclude homo-
sexuals.14 When a homosexual is discovered or "confesses," the 
service involved usually encourages the resignation of that per-
son.15 Sometimes the embattled servicemember can strike a deal 
whereby he or she "voluntarily" resigns from the service, and 
thus avoids administrative proceedings.16 When a homosexual 
servicemember refuses to cooperate with this general scheme, 
the military's elaborate administrative machinery can be 
brought to bear upon him.17 
Typically, the forced separation of a gay servicemember fol-
lows the same basic course in all branches of the service.1s Once 
a complaint has been received about a suspected homosexual, an 
investigative agency goes to work.19 The investigator(s) talks to 
the complainant,20 to witnesses,21 and sometimes to the suspect 
himself.22 The agency composes and submits a final report to the 
suspect's commanding officer. The commanding officer then de-
cides if there is sufficient evidence to proceed.23 If not, the pro-
cess ends at that point. If the commanding officer elects to pro-
12. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 116. 
13. See Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-34 n.82 (citing various regulations by 
branch). 
14. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6·3 to -4. The regulations and branches of service 
represented are: Army, AR 635·200, Ch. 15; Air Force, AFR 39-10; Navy, NAVMILPERSMAN 
3630400; and Marine Corps, MARCORSEPMAN 6207. ld. at 6-4. 
15. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-5 to -6. 
16. ld. at 6-6. 
17. I d. The textual discussion of the administrative discharge procedure that follows 
is taken largely from Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-10 to -21. 
18. ld. at 6-10 to -11. 
19. ld. at 6-10. In the case of the Navy, this agency is the Naval Investigative Ser-
vice (NIS). 
20. ld. at 6-9 to -10. The complainant could be almost anyone, from an aggrieved 
lover to the recipient of unwanted homosexual advances to an informant. ld. Even mili-
tary chaplains and psychiatrists can be complainants, as they are not obligated to treat 
confessions of homosexuality with confidentiality. ld. 
21. ld. at 6-10. 
22. ld. at 6-10. 
23. ld. at 6-11. The suspect's commanding officer exercises a great deal of discretion 
in deciding how accusations of homosexuality against one of his subordinates will be 
handled. ld. at 6-11, 6-15 to -17. 
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ceed, the suspect is informed that he is being considered for 
administrative discharge for homosexuality.24 The suspect is also 
advised of his rights to silence, counsel, and free services of a 
military lawyer.25 In addition, the suspect may also hire a civil-
ian attorney, if he or she can afford one.26 
Once the suspect's commanding officer has made the deci-
sion to go forward, he appoints a recorder to take charge of the 
"prosecution." The recorder presents the service's case against 
the accused.27 The commander also appoints at least three of-
ficers to sit on the Administrative Discharge Board.28 In Navy 
proceedings, the officer of the rank of lieutenant commander or 
above is senior member or president of the Board.29 During the 
hearing itself, the president rules on objections, but a majority 
of the Board can overrule him.30 
At the hearing, defendant's counsel can interview the Board 
members and challenge them for cause,31 usually prejudice.32 
Those Board members whom defense counsel does not challenge 
then make recommendations to the suspect's commanding of-
ficer about whether or not to keep the challenged members on 
the Board.33 The commanding officer has the power to ignore the 
24. Id. at 6-11. 
25. Id. at 6-11 to -12. 
26. Id. at 6-12. Bourdonnay suggests that retention of a civilian attorney may result 
in a more forceful defense, since military lawyers are frequently overworked and there is 
always a danger of conflict of interest when a military attorney openly opposes the aims 
of his superiors. Id. 
27. Id. at 6-15. 
28. Id. at 6-16. 
29. Id. at 6-15. The suspect's commanding officer exercises a great deal of control 
and influence in the entire chain of events following accusations of homosexuality against 
members of his command. Id. at 6~11, 6-15 to -17. The commanding officer not only 
appoints the "prosecutor," but also the "judges" who sit on the Board itself. Id. It thus 
seems clear that a commanding officer who seeks to influence the outcome of a hearing 
has a very good chance of doing so, provided he knows his officers well. Id. See also infra 
text accompanying notes 33-34 for further discussion of the commanding officer's role. 
30. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-18 n.47. 
31. Id. at 6-16. 
32. Id. at 6-16 to -17. Bourdonnay urges defense counsel to question Board members 
extensively to elicit their views on gay rights. Id. In addition, she also suggests using the 
opportunity to discuss the nature of the accusations and the standard of proof necessary 
to convince the Board members of guilt. In this way, Board members can perhaps be 
sensitized with regard to the relative ease with which accusations are made, and perhaps 
prejudices can be somewhat allayed. Id. 
33. Id. at 6-17. 
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challenges and allow the members involved to sit on the Board.34 
Should he decide to replace them, the defendant's counsel may 
also challenge the new members, following the same 
procedures.35 
For some Administrative Discharge Board hearings, the 
commanding officer involved may appoint a nonvoting legal ad-
visor36 to aid Board members, but this is not mandatory.37 The 
hearings are often very informal and often conducted according 
to very lax rules of evidence.3s This is especially true at hearings 
prompted by accusations of homosexuality, where the chief 
source of evidence is hearsay or innuendo. In such situations, 
notes one writer, "the regulations are frequently, blatantly 
disregarded. "39 
At the hearing, the defendant may remain silent40 or may 
make an unsworn statement without being cross-examined.41 If 
he chooses to make a sworn statement, however, he is subject to 
cross-examination.42 In theory, no adverse inferences should be 
drawn from a defendant's refusal to submit to cross-examina-
tion,43 but the fact remains that refusal to make a sworn state-
ment, in a military or a civil court, frequently carries with it a 
stigma of guilt.44 
Following the presentation of evidence, the Board deliber-
ates, returning findings of fact and recommending retention or 
discharge of the defendant.45 The Separation Authority,46 which 
has the power to approve, disapprove, or modify the decision, 
34.ld. 
35. ld. at 6-16 to -18. 
36. ld. at 6-13 n.36. 
37.ld. 
38. ld. at 6-18. The informality of such proceedings should be clear from the fact 
that the defendant's commanding officer exercises almost supreme power in determining 
the outcome. See supra notes 23, 29 and accompanying text. This power is enhanced by 
the fact that strict rules of evidence are not used at the hearing itself. Bourdonnay, 
supra note 9, at 6-18. 
39. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-18. 
40.ld. 
41. ld. 
42. ld. at 6-18 to -19. 
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then reviews the Board's decision.47 The Separation Authority 
has wide discretion to order a new administrative discharge 
hearing,48 to upgrade the level of the discharge,49 or even to rec-
ommend a discharge where the original hearing Board has rec-
ommended retention. 50 The final power to review the decision 
and/or upgrade the level of the discharge rests with the Secre-
tary of the Navy.51 Should the Secretary decide not to amend 
the discharge recommendation, the defendant is informed that 
the discharge has been approved and outprocessing will begin, 
usually within a few days.52 At that point, the only feasible op-
tion for a servicemember who wishes to remain in the Navy is to 
seek an injunction from the relevant United States district 
court, pending judicial review. 53 District courts have frequently 
granted summary judgment in favor of the service seeking the 
discharge,54 although there have been some exceptions ov~r the 
years. 55 In Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force,56 for exam-
ple, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the 
discharge of a much-decorated sergeant who had admitted to be-
ing homosexual. 57 The court found that the Administrative Dis-
charge Board's findings were "conclusory ... without any real 





51. ld. at 6-20 to -21. The Secretary almost never modifies a discharge order, though 
upgrading of discharges is not uncommon. See, e.g., Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. 
52. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-21. "Outprocessing" is simply the administrative 
process through which an active duty military member is discharged. 
53. ld. at 6-21. The jurisdiction of federal courts to review the legality of military 
discharges was established by the Supreme Court in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 
(1958). In that case, involving a soldier who sought an injunction to force the Army to 
upgrade his dishonorable discharge to honorable, the Court held that the district court 
had the power to determine its jurisdiction over the matter and to determine if the Sec-
retary of the Army had exceeded his authority in granting Harmon the dishonorable 
discharge. ld. at 582. 
54. See, e.g., Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. See also Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 
788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980). In that case, both of Saal's co-plaintiffs 
were appealing from summary judgments granted in favor of the Navy. ld. at 794, 795. 
55. See, e.g., Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (Ca. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Beller 
v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980). In Saal, 
the district court found that the Air Force's systematic expulsion of homosexual ser-
vicemembers was irratio~al, "at least as applied to her." Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 202. See 
infra text accompanying notes 65-67 for further discussion. 
56. 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
57. ld. at 861. 
58. ld. at 855. 
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to retain Matlovich in the service. 59 The Air Force regulation 
under which Matlovich was ordered discharged permitted reten-
tion in unusual circumstances provided that the airman's ability 
to continue to serve had not been compromised.60 Because 
neither the Board nor the Secretary of the Air Force had ex-
plained how this rule had been applied in Matlovich's case, the 
court ordered the case remanded,61 so that the Air Force could 
present a more complete explanation and the court, in turn, 
could determine if that exercise of discretion was "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or unlawful."62 Following remand, Matlovich agreed 
not to return to active duty, in return for an out-of-court 
settlement.63 
When permitting a full hearing on the issues, most courts 
have ruled in favor of the military.64 One exception was Saal v. 
Middendorf,65 in which the district court found that the Navy's 
refusal to allow an otherwise exemplary servicemember to re-en-
list solely because of her homosexuality was irrational and capri-
cious, "at least as applied to her."66 The district court ordered 
the Navy to consider Saal's request to re-enlist in the light of all 
relevant factors and "free of any policy of mandatory exclu-
sion."67 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed.6s It held that the Navy's actions had not violated 
the due process clause,69 and that the right to privacy was not 
applicable to homosexual relations, at least not in a military 
context.70 The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the 
59. ld. 
60. ld. 
61. ld. at 857, 861. 
62. ld. at 857. If the regulation were found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful," 
then presumably the classification(s) contained within it would have been struck down 
by the due process clause and/or the equal protection clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1. 
63. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-5. Disappointing as the denouement of 
Matlovich was, it is difficult to imagine Sergeant Matlovich actually returning to active 
duty, considering the resentments and notoriety that would have followed him through-
out the rest of his military career. 
64. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 124. 
65. 427 F. Supp. 192 (Ca. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980). 
66. Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 202. 
67. ld. at 203. 
68. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980). 
69. ld. at 812. 
70. ld. at 810-11. The court accordingly applied the "rational basis" test, and found 
7
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case.71 
The regulations governing the discharge of homosexuals 
from the military are nominally promulgated by the secretary of 
each service.72 They are regularly amended or reworded,73 but 
there has been very little change in the last five years.74 During 
litigation, the branch involved usually admits that not all gay 
servicemembers are automatically discharged.75 Nevertheless, it 
is difficult, considering the excellent service records of some of 
those who have been discharged,76 to find any hard and fast 
standards with regard to a decision to retain gay ser-
vicemembers.77 The question may be meaningless after the re-
versal of Baal, which suggested that, for the time being at least, 
the armed forces enjoy wide discretion in discharging or retain-
ing gay members.78 
that the Air Force's policy of discharging homosexuals was rationally related to several 
legitimate goals, including maintenance of security, discipline, and morale. [d. 
71. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1980). 
72. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-3, 6-6. Though each secretary has some discre-
tion in formulating the regulations for his or her branch, the regulations relating to 
homosexuals are very similar in all branches-and similarly sweeping in their effects. [d. 
73. [d. at 6-5 to -6. After the reversal of Saal, a "new tightening of policy" became 
apparent in the Defense Department. [d. 
74. Id. 
75. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 802 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 
(1980). In Beller, the court noted that the Navy did not discharge all homosexuals it 
discovered in the service. Id. at 805. At the same time, the court also found that the 
Navy's policy of discharging homosexuals, when it was applied, did not violate the con-
stitutional right to privacy. Id. at 810. 
76. As noted, Sergeant Matlovich had received numerous commendations and deco-
rations during his military career. Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 854 n.4. In fact, Sergeant 
Matlovich was a recipient of the Purple Heart and the Bronze Star, and had volunteered 
for service in Vietnam. Id. "Airman" Saal also had a fine service record, having been 
lauded for her "fine military behavior" and "[hJighly recommended for advancement 
and reenlistment." Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 203-04 (emphasis in original). See also Nelson 
v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 476 (3rd Cir. 1967) (a highly qualified electronics engineer was 
ordered discharged from the Navy for one incident of homosexuality, despite ten years of 
service, and despite the fact that the Administrative Discharge Board had unanimously 
recommended retention). 
77. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
78. The Beller court, while finding the Navy regulations on homosexuality "perhaps 
broader than necessary," nevertheless upheld them as "a reasonable effort to accommo-
date the needs of the government with the interests of the individual." Beller v. Mid-
dendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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III. THE DRONENBURG DECISION 
A. FACTS OF DRONENBURG 
James L. Dronenburg joined the Navy at the age of eigh-
teen. He was trained as a Korean linguist and cryptographer. 
During his service with the Navy, he compiled an impressive 
record of commendations for job performance and earned a top 
security clearance.79 Dronenburg had been promoted to Petty 
Officer after nine years in the Navy when he was enrolled as a 
student at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, 
California. so 
Mter a nineteen-year-old seaman recruit, who was also a 
student at the Language Institute, made sworn statements ac-
cusing Dronenburg of repeated homosexual acts,S1 the Navy be-
gan an investigation.s2 Mter first denying the allegations,s3 
Dronenburg admitted that he had engaged in homosexual rela-
tions in a barracks on the Navy base.s4 Shortly thereafter, the 
Navy informed Dronenburg that it would seek to administra-
tively discharge him.s5 
During a two-day hearing before an Administrative Dis-
charge Board, Dronenburg testified at length with counsel pre-
sent.S8 He again admitted having engaged in the homosexual 
acts of which he was accused.s7 The three-member Board recom-
mended that Dronenburg be discharged;SS two members sug-
gested that the discharge be characterized as "general" and the 
third member voted for an "honorable" discharge.s9 The Secre-










89. Id. The general discharge is also known as a discharge "under honorable condi-
tions." C. SHANOR & T. TERRELL, MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 239 (1980). Such a dis-
charge is usually given for "unsuitability, which indicates some type of character prob-
lem over which the servicemember has no contro!." Id. Though a general discharge may 
carry some degree of stigma for the veteran seeking post-service employment, it is not a 
bar to the collection of military benefits. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (1985). 
9
Dalby: Gay Rights in the Military
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
540 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:531 
tary of the Navy reviewed the case at Dronenburg's request, af-
firming the discharge order, but directing that the discharge be 
"honorable. "90 Following this decision, Dronenburg challenged 
the discharge order in federal district court.91 The district court 
granted summary judgment for the Navy, and Dronenburg ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals, District of Colum-
bia Circuit.92 
B. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The court in Dronenburg relied heavily on Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney,93 in which a Virginia district court upheld a 
state law which made it a felony for any person to "carnally 
know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the. 
mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge .... "94 
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Doe,95 leading the court 
in Dronenburg to conclude that if a civil statute that prohibits 
'sodomy (among other acts) is constitutional, then a military reg-
ulation which has the same effect is certainly permissible, given 
the need for even greater restrictions on personal freedom 
among the personnel of the armed forces.9s 
Dronenburg contended that Doe was not an authoritative 
decision by the Supreme Court,97 since the plaintiffs in that case 
were homosexuals who had not been charged under Virginia's 
sodomy statute, but who merely sought a declaratory judgment 
that the law as written was unconstitutional.98 Viewed in this 
90. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. 
91. Id. 
92.Id. 
93. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aft'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
94. VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1982). 
95. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
96. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. The court based this view on cases such as 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), where the Court upheld the court-martial and con-
viction of an Army officer accused of making statements disllPproving of the war in Viet-
nam. The Court found that the Army's need for discipline and combat readiness necessi-
tated a "different application" of first amendment protections to servicemembers. Id. at 
758. See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980), where the Court upheld an Air Force 
regulation which prohibited servicemembers from circulating petitions intended for Con-
gress on military bases without the express permission of the base commander. Id. at 
361. Needless to say, a first amendment decision is not necessarily dispositive of the 
issues in a case based on the right to privacy. 
97. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. 
98.Id. 
10
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light, Doe would represent merely a concurrence in the judg-
ment by the Supreme Court, but not necessarily an endorsement 
of the reasoning of the district court on the merits of the case.99 
The Supreme Court might have affirmed based on plaintiffs' 
lack of standing, rather than on the district court's constitu-
tional analysis. Admitting for the sake of argument that Doe was 
"somewhat ambiguous precedent,"loo the Dronenburg court pro-
ceeded to review the plaintiff's appeal and its constitutional 
bases.lol 
Dronenburg based his appeal on two grounds: the right to 
privacy included in the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment and the equal protection clause of the same amend-
ment.l02 The court's analysis and disposition of both claims was 
somewhat similar.l03 
In his right to privacy argument, Dronenburg relied on Gris-
wold v. Connecticut/o" the first Supreme Court case to recognize 
a general constitutional right to privacy. lOIS In Griswold, the 
Court invalidated a Connecticut law which prohibited the use of 
contraceptives,108 holding that such a law was violative of a con-
stitutionally-based right to privacy.l07 This right was not found 
in any specific section or amendment of the Constitution, but 
rather in various penumbras or emanations from several distinct 
amendments. lOS Portions of the "several fundamental constitu-
99. [d. See also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
When we summarily affirm, without opinion, • • . we affirm 
the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it 
was settled. An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the 
issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation 
by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opin-
ions after full argument. 
[d. at 391-92. 
100. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. 
101. [d. at 1391-98. 
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1 provides that no state shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [d. 
103. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392-96, 1397-98. 
104. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
105. [d. at 485. 
106. [d. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958». 
107. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. 
108. [d. 
11
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tional guarantees"I09 found in the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, 
and fourteenth amendments, when taken collectively, were 
found to create a right of privacy inherent in marriage which the 
state could not violate.110 Connecticut's anti-contraceptive stat-
ute could not be enforced without violating that right, by virtue 
of "the sanctity of the marital bedroom."lll Dronenburg also re-
lied on the privacy cases which followed Griswold, particularly 
Eisenstadt v. Bairdll2 and Roe v. Wade.1l3 Eisenstadt invali-
dated a Massachusetts statute which prohibited the distribution 
of contraceptives to unmarried persons.114 The basis for the Ei-
senstadt holding was the equal protection clause, and the Court 
emphasized that the right to privacy applied equally to individ-
uals, whether married or single, in "matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child."115 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that no state could 
prevent a woman from terminating her pregnancy by abortion 
during the first trimester of pregnancy.ll6 The right to privacy 
discussed in Roe was founded squarely in the fourteenth amend-
ment's concepts of "personal liberty and restrictions upon state 
action .... "117 
Based on Griswold and its progeny, Dronenburg asserted 
that his right to privacy guaranteed personal autonomy and a 
right to control intimate personal decisions about one's own 
body, absent a compelling state interest in interfering with those 
rights.lls In Roe v. Wade, the Court employed the strict scrutiny 
test, the test normally used by the Supreme Court when review-
ing enactments that implicate constitutional guarantees and 
"fundamental" rights.1l9 Nevertheless, the District of Columbia 
109. ld. at 485. 
110. ld. at 484-86. 
111. ld. at 486. 
112. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
114. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
115. ld. at 453. 
116. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
117. ld. at 153. 
118. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391. 
119. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64. Applying the strict scrutiny test in the abortion con-
text, the Court found compelling state interests in protecting both maternal and fetal 
health, but these interests were secondary to the individual's right of privacy until after 
12
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Circuit Court chose to interpret the right to privacy quite nar-
rowly,120 as encompassing only the right to make personal deci-
sions about procreation and childbearing.121 Having found the 
right to privacy inapplicable to the issue of homosexual activi-
ties,122 the court asserted further that the cases cited by 
Dronenburg could not be extrapolated to cover the question of 
homosexuals in the military.123 Accordingly, the Dronenburg 
court applied only the rational basis test to the Navy regulation 
in question.124 
The rational basis test is the test normally used in due pro-
cess and equal protection analysis when fundamental rights or 
suspect classifications are not involved.125 A court applying the 
test to a statute must ask if the enactment in question bears a 
rational relation to a permissible and legitimate state interest. If 
a rational basis for the law is present and it is not arbitrary or 
capricious, the court must allow it to stand.126 The court in 
Dronenburg found numerous rational bases for Instruction 
1900.9C,127 including the Navy's need for discipline and mo-
rale,128 the possibilities of unrest if openly gay sailors were al-
the first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 163. 
120. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395-96. 
121. Id. "The Court has listed as illustrative of the right of privacy such matters as 
activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing and education. It need hardly be said that none of these covers a right to homo-
sexual conduct." I d. 
[d. 
122.Id. 
123. Id. at 1396. The court explained: 
The question then becomes whether there is a more general 
principle that explains these cases and is capable of extrapola-
tion to new claims not previously decided by the Supreme 
Court. It is true that the principle appellant advances would 
explain all of these cases, but so would many other, less 
sweeping principles. 
124. Id. at 1397-98. In applying minimal scrutiny to the Navy's treatment of homo-
sexuals, the court stated, "The Navy is not required to produce social science data or the 
results of controlled experiments to prove what common sense and common experience 
demonstrate." Id. The court concluded that the presence of homosexuals in a military 
unit is "almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline." Id. at 1398. 
125. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also supra note 6 
and accompanying text. 
126. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88. 
127. SEC/NA V Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216, quoted 
in Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. As noted, the Instruction provided for the discharge of 
any Navy personnel who "solicits, attempts, or engages in homosexual acts." Id. 
128. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. 
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lowed to remain in the Navy,t29 and the danger of "homosexual 
seduction" practiced by military superiors over lower ranking 
servicemembers.13o Finding that the Navy's discharge of homo-
sexuals was a rational means of effecting a legitimate interest,131 
the court dismissed Dronenburg's right to privacy arguments.132 
- The court analyzed Dronenburg's equal protection argu-
ments in much the same way.133 Dronenburg contended that 
permitting discrimination within the Navy against homosexuals 
would result in increased discrimination directed against other 
"unpopular" minority groups within the armed forces.134 The 
court rejected this argument as "completely frivolous,"135 noting 
that a failure to grant constitutional protections to homosexuals 
did not thereby destroy established protections of other racial 
and ethnic minorities.13G 
The court further found that naval regulations based on 
morality were not ipso facto violative of the equal protection 
clause.137 Finding moral values pervasive in most of society's leg-
islation, the court emphasized that "majority morality" is "con-
clusively valid,"I3S so long as the enactments involved are not in 
themselves in conflict with the Constitution.139 Since the court 




132. Id. at 1395-97. "[T]his regulation is plainly a rational means of advancing a • 
legitimate, indeed a crucial, interest common to all our armed forces." Id. at 1398. 
133. Id. at 1397-98. 
134. Id. at 1397. 
135.Id. 
136. Id. "The Constitution has provisions that create specific rights. These protect, 
among others, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. If a court refuses to create a new 
constitutional right to protect homosexual conduct, the court does not thereby destroy 




139. Id. "When the Constitution does not speak to the contrary, the choices of those 
put in authority by the electoral process, or those who are accountable to such persons, 
come before us not as suspect because majoritarian but as conclusively valid for that 
very reason." Id. While military authorities are accountable to the President of the 
United States, the difficulty of repealing or amending a military regulation through the 
political process is self-evident. This is especially true in light of the restrictions put on 
the first amendment rights of members of the armed forces, as alluded to earlier. See 
supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
14
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gage in homosexual conduct, either under the aegis of the right 
of privacy or as a fundamental right, and that the Navy regula-
tions involved were rationally related to legitimate ends, the 
court rejected Dronenburg's equal protection arguments.140 The 
court concluded by suggesting that the question of gay rights 
was a political one, not one for the courts.141 
IV. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DRONENBURG 
The decision in Dronenburg v. Zech142 is one more brick in 
the judicial wall which declares that there is no constitutional 
protection for homosexual activities.143 The cornerstone of this 
wall is the oft-cited decision in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney.144 But even without Doe, as the Dronenburg court made 
clear,146 there is a general reluctance on the part of judges to 
strike down anti-homosexuality legislation because of the view 
that such decisions "create" new constitutional rights.146 The 
plaintiff in Dronenburg, of course, maintained that it was not 
the creation of new constitutional rights that he was seeking, but 
simply the recognition of rights that he argued were inherent in 
the right to privacy.147 
Is the court of appeals' interpretation of Griswold v. Con-
necticut148 and its progeny149 consistent with the meaning and 
140. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. 
141. [d. at 1397. "If the revolution in sexual mores that appellant proclaims is in 
fact ever to arrive, we think it must arrive through the moral choices of the people and 
their elected representatives, not through the ukase of this court." [d. 
142. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
143. [d. at 1397. 
144. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
145. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. "But even should we agree that Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney is somewhat ambiguous precedent, we would not extend the right 
of privacy created by the Supreme Court to cover appellant's conduct here." [d. 
146. [d. at 1396-97. 
147. [d. at 1391, 1395-96. The record is sparse regarding details of Dronenburg's 
relationship with the seaman recruit who implicated him in homosexual conduct. In this 
regard, the court stated only that the young man "chose to break off the relationship." 
Certainly the question arises of whether or not a gay "marriage" or "family" situation 
might be more likely to find protections under the right of privacy than simply homosex-
ual activity in general. The court in Dronenburg did not address this issue, but it is 
certainly significant in light of two more recent decisions. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 
F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 103 S. Ct. 3244 (1984). See also infra 
note 201 and accompanying text for discussion. 
148. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
15
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spirit of those cases? Since the Supreme Court recognized the 
constitutional right of privacy in 1965,150 it has been expanded 
and rephrased in numerous ways. For example, in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,151 this right was held to encompass "matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child,"152 thus suggesting that there were some areas in 
addition to procreation and contraception that were subject to 
the protection of the right to privacy.153 The Dronenburg court 
refused to consider the question of whether or not one's choice 
of sexual partner was a matter as fundamental as the decision to 
become a parent, claiming that Eisenstadt provided no criteria 
for determining what rights were included in that category.154 
Similarly, in discussing Roe v. Wade/55 the Dronenburg 
court acknowledged the broad implications of the decision,158 
but emphasized the Supreme Court's observation in Roe that 
the right to privacy did not guarantee an unlimited right to do 
as one pleased with one's body.157 But the limiting factors listed 
in Roe were the state's interests in "safeguarding health, in 
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
150. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
151. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
152. Id. at 453. 
153. Id. The open-endedness of the language used in Eisenstadt is undeniable, 
though time and events have demonstrated a general reluctance to extend the right of 
privacy beyond the areas of procreation and contraception. See, e.g., Dronenburg, 741 
F.2d at 1395-96. See also supra notes 121 & 123 (language used in Dronenburg). 
154. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1393-94. Since choice of sexual partner is a vital pre-
requisite to making the decision to become a parent, it might well be argued that the 
right to choose one's spouse or sexual partner does fit within Eisenstadt's contemplation 
of fundamental rights (emphasis added). See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. Certainly the 
Supreme Court has been staunch in its support for the right to marry, and for the right 
to choose a husband or wife, unhampered by irrational state regulations. See, e.g., Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down a state law which made it a crime for 
any white person to intermarry with someone of another race. Id. at 11-12. See also 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), in which the court invalidated a Wisconsin 
statute which prevented the issuance of a marriage license to any person who was delin-
quent in support payments to minor children not in his or her custody. Id. at 377. The 
basis for the decision in both cases was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 377; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. In addition, in Loving, the 
Court noted that the due process clause of the same amendment would also have acted 
to invalidate the statute. Id. at 12. 
155. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
156. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395. 
157. Id. The court also remarked that Roe "provided no explanatory principle that 
informs a lower court how to reason about what is and what is not encompassed by the 
right of privacy." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973». 
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maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential 
life,"11!8 all matters that arguably do not arise in the choice of a 
sexual partner. Even assuming that a statute barring homosex-
ual activities might be based partly on a desire to stem the 
spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS),lI59 
there is still some question of whether or not such a purpose 
would bear a rational relationship to the means used to imple-
ment it. The severity of AIDS, which has no known cause or 
cure, and the fact that some seventy percent of its victims are 
homosexual or bisexuallso might lend considerable support for 
any law regulating homosexual activities, at least in the search 
for any articulable rational basis. lSI One writer has opined, 
"[T]he nature of the threat may be so compelling- that most 
courts would find that closing [gay] bathhouses would withstand 
any degree of scrutiny."ls2 In any event, the Navy's regulations 
have nothing to do with the physical health of servicemembers, 
at least at present; discipline and morale are clearly the goals of 
Instruction 1900.9C.Is3 The emphasis on health in Roe thus 
seems inapposite in a discussion of a homosexual's right to pri-
vacy. The Dronenburg court concluded the matter by noting 
that both Roe and Eisenstadt had left the right to privacy some-
what general and undefined.ls4 It used this fact as a justification 
for removing the plaintiff's claim from the right to privacy 
arena. lSI! 
The Dronenburg court's refusal to grant private, consensual 
homosexual conduct the protections of the equal protection 
158. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
159. See Comment, Preventing the Spread of AIDS By Restricting Sexual Conduct 
in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 301 (1985), 
for a general discussion of AIDS and its symptoms, as well as the constitutional ramifica-
tions of attempts to halt the spread of the disease. 
160. Id. at 303. 
161. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); see also supra note 6 
(discussing Williamson). At its most deferential, the rational basis tests seeks only any 
conceivable rational basis for the legislation under consideration. Williamson, 348 U.S. 
at 487-88. 
162. Comment, supra note 159, at 323. 
163. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389 (quoting SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 
1978); Joint Appendix at 216). The Instruction itself states of homosexuals in the armed 
forces: "The presence of such a member in a military environment seriously impairs 
combat readiness, efficiency, security, and morale." Id. 
164. [d. at 1395. 
165. Id. 
17
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clause was brief and conclusory.166 The court simply asserted 
that a finding that there was a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual conduct in private would necessarily grant protected 
status to "any and all private sexual behavior."l67 The court of-
fered no support for this view,168 but simply pressed on to the 
application of the rational basis test. Again, the regulation 
passed muster .169 
In his dissent in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,l7O Dis-
trict Judge Merhige asserted his view that private consensual 
sex acts between adults were matters in which the state had no 
legitimate interest, absent any evidence of harm.171 This view 
has been adopted by a few courts, most recently by the United 
States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, in Hardwick v. 
Bowers.172 
In Hardwick, the court struck down a Georgia statute 
prohibiting sodomy,173 finding that it violated the fundamental 
constitutional rights of the plaintiff, a young man who was ar-
rested and charged with violating the statute.174 The prosecutor 
refused to present the case to a grand jury and Hardwick was 
released.l7I5 Nevertheless, the court found that Hardwick had 
166. Id. at 1396. Indeed, the Dronenburg court stated at the outset that resolution 
of the plaintiff's equal protection arguments was "to some extent dependent" upon the 
resolution of his right to privacy claims. Id. at 1391. This may explain the rather brief 
treatment of Dronenburg's equal protection claim. 
167. Id. at 1396. "We would find it impossible to conclude that a right to homosex-
ual conduct is 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' unless any and 
all private sexual behavior falls within those categories, a conclusion we are unwilling to 
draw." Id. 
168. The conclusion that protecting consensual homosexual relations through the 
right to privacy amounts to constitutional protection for all sexual acts is without a logi-
cal basis. California has essentially decriminali2ed sodomy when performed by con-
senting adults under Penal Code section 286. CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West 1985 & Supp. 
1986). That statute makes sodomy a crime only when it is accomplished by force, per-
formed on a minor, or committed by jailor prison inmates. Id. Needless to say, the 
liberalizing of California's sex laws in this area has not resulted in the legalization of 
prostitution, child molestation, or sado-masochism. 
169. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397-98. 
170. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) 
(Merhige, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 1203. 
172. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th_Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985). 
173. GA. CODE § 16-6-2 (1984) which makes it a felony to perform or submit to "any 
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. [d. 
174. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211. 
175. Id. at 1204. 
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standing to challenge the law, based on his reasonable subjective 
fear of future prosecution on the same charge.176 
The Hardwick court based its decision squarely on the right 
to privacy/" as enunciated in Griswold/78 Eisenstadt/79 and 
other cases in which the Supreme Court defended the right to 
marry.180 Significantly, the court noted, "For some, the sexual 
activity in question here serves the same purpose as the inti-
macy of marriage."l8l The Hardwick court also placed great 
weight on the fact that the plaintiff planned to carryon homo-
sexual activities in private.182 Finding an absence of "public 
ramifications"183 in Hardwick's case, the court applied the pro-
tections of the right to privacy to his case, and employed the 
strict scrutiny test.184 Because Hardwick's homosexual activities 
were part of an intimate association analogous to marriage and 
would be carried on in private, the court found that the Georgia 
sodomy statute implicated fundamental rights.181> The court 
therefore remanded the case, requiring the state of Georgia to 
prove a compelling state interest and that the statute in ques-
tion was the most narrowly drawn means of serving that 
interest. 186 
176. Id. at 1205-06. 
177. Id. at 1212. 
178. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
179. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
180. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
See supra note 154 for a discussion of both cases. 
181. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212. 
182. Id. at 1211, 1212. 
183. Id. at 1212. The court in Hardwick, analogi2ed private consensual homosexual 
activity to the private possession of obscene materials for one's own use. Id. The latter 
activity was found to be protected by the right to privacy in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557 (1969), a case involving obscene films which the defendant possessed for his own 
private viewing. One might wonder, however, if the "public ramifications" of homosexu-
ality might be more serious or costly in a military setting. The comparison may be more 
apt if we assume the existence of actual privacy for those homosexuals within the armed 
forces who wish to carry on relationships and remain in the military. In reality, such 
seclusion might be hard to obtain for the average serviceme~ber during the day-to-day 
rigors of active duty. 
184. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211, 1213. Mter subjecting the statute in question to 
strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the plaintiff's fundamental rights were impli-
cated. Accordingly, the court remanded the case, ordering that Georgia prove that the 
law served a compelling state interest through the most narrowly drawn means. Id. at 
1211,1213. 
185. Id. at 1211. 
186. Id. at 1211, 1213. 
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The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in Hard-
wick. Is7 The Hardwick court's heavy reliance on similarities be-
tween the plaintiff's homosexual relationships and a heterosex-
ual marriage are especially interesting in light of some of the 
dicta in the recent Supreme Court case of Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees. 188 In Jaycees, the Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge by the Jaycees to a Minnesota law which prohibited 
discrimination based on gender in "public accomodations."Is9 In 
holding that the statute did not violate the right to privacy of 
the members of the Jaycees/90 Justice Brennan noted that the 
fourteenth amendment right to privacy protects personal choices 
to enter into certain types of intimate relationships,I91 primarily 
those that "attend the creation and sustenance of a family."192 
These family relationships, Justice Brennan suggested, are char-
acterized by a relatively small number of members,I93 a high de-
gree of selectivity in deciding to begin and maintain the rela-
tionship(s),194 and "seclusion from others in critical aspects of 
the relationship."1911 The Jaycees' membership selection could 
not be characterized in this manner and hence could not find 
constitutional shelter by that argument. The factors enumerated 
in Jaycees are arguably applicable to a gay relationship, and 
they are very similar to the chief considerations of the Hardwick 
court: privacy of the associationI96 and the similarity of the asso-
ciation to marriage.I97 It remains to be seen if the Supreme 
Court will forcefully apply the dicta in Jaycees when it decides 
Hardwick. 
Many states have taken the question out of the hands of the 
187. 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985). 
188. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984). 
189. [d. at 3251-52. The Jaycees permitted only men between the ages of 18 and 35 
to be "regular" members, with the power to vote and hold office in the organization. [d. 
at 3247. When the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters began admitting women as regular 
members in 1974 and 1975 respectively, the national organization imposed sanctions, in-
cluding not counting those chapters' votes at national conventions and not permitting 
their members to hold national Jaycees offices. [d. at 3247-48. 
190. [d. at 3251-52. 





196. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212. 
197. [d. 
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courts by liberalizing their laws to allow most kinds of sexual 
activity between consenting adults.198 However, twenty-five 
states still have statutes that criminalize homosexual rela-
tions;199 nineteen states also outlaw certain sex acts between 
men and women.200 Even if the Supreme Court upholds the 
Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick, this would not necessarily invali-
date all state restrictions on private consensual sexual activity; 
much may depend upon how close the questionable activity is to 
a marriage or family relationship.201 
Changes in the laws regarding consensual sexual relations 
between adults may 'have little effect on the situation in the mil-
itary.202 The military's status as a society unto itself, with se-
verely limited constitutional protections for its members, is well-
established.203 The willingness of the Supreme Court to allow 
members of the armed forces "a different application of those 
protections"204 guaranteed by the Constitution has combined 
with the inherent conservatism of the military to make reform 
grindingly slow.205 The need for discipline and obedience among 
the soldiers and sailors defending the United States is, as al-
ways, the justification preventing any rapid or widespread re-
198. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986). See also supra 
note 168 for brief discussion of section 286). 
199. High Court to Study Homosexual's Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1985, at Y11, 
col. 1. 
200. [d. at col. 3. 
201. Certainly from a strategic viewpoint, it would be easier (and arguably more 
consistent with Griswold and its progeny) to argue that the right of privacy extends at 
least to gay "marriages" or relationships that approximate the stability of the family. 
This limited approach would probably find more favor than a general "all or nothing" 
approach which would seek legitimacy for all homosexual activities, no matter how cas-
ual or how promiscuous the participants. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for discussion of constitutional rights 
in a military context. 
203. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 
(1980). Both of these cases upheld limitations on the first amendment rights enjoyed by 
members of the United States armed forces. See also supra note 96 and accompanying 
text. 
204. Parker:, 417 U.S. at 758. 
205. McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 116-17. The innate conservatism of the 
American military is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the decisions to integrate 
the armed forces along racial and gender lines were preceded by years of heated, often 
rancorous debates. In both cases, those arguing for the maintenance of the status quo 
emphasized the effects on morale and efficiency among the troops that would result from 
the free interaction between white male troops and black and women troops respectively. 
[d. 
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form.206 There is no question that discipline and obedience are 
compelling interests in a military context. The real question is, 
how far may constitutional rights be denied or abridged by the 
authorities in serving those interests? 
One writer has estimated that the United States military 
discharges some two thousand men and women each year for 
suspected homosexuality.207 Many of these people, like Petty Of-
ficer Dronenburg, have excellent service records.208 As noted, 
discharge is not always mandatory.209 The Discharge Board exer-
cises some discretion in making recommendations,210 and the 
Secretary of the Navy has the power, seldom exercised,211 of ap-
pellate review.212 The potential for inequity, for arbitrary dis-
charges, is very great, as even a perfunctory study of some of the 
better-known cases has shown.213 
In formulating its regulations, the Department of the Navy 
has freely generalized about both homosexual and heterosexual 
members of the service.214 The presumption behind the Navy's 
206. [d. 
207. Futcher, Military Homophobia: Ex-Officer Fights Back, PLEXUS, Sept. 1985, at 
1. 
208. Petty Officer Dronenburg, as noted, had received many commendations during 
his career and had received top security clearance. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. Ser-
geant Matlovich, as noted, was a recipient of the Purple Heart who had volunteered for 
service in Vietnam. Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 854 n.4. Certainly both men's careers suggest 
that the military brass' preoccupation with homosexuals as security risks were 
unwarranted. 
209. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
905 (1980). See also McCrary & Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 117. 
210. Bourdonnay, supra note 9, at 6-19. 
211. [d. at 6-21. 
212. [d. at 6-20 to -21. 
213. Consider, once again, the achievements of "Airman" Saal and of Sergeant 
Matlovich, both of whom had excellent service records up until (and even beyond) the 
discovery of their homosexuality. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for relevant 
discussion. 
214. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
905 (1980). In Beller, the court included in its opinion excerpts from an affidavit submit-
ted to it from the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel. The affidavit stated, in part, that 
"the great majority of naval personnel [who] despise/detest homosexuality, especially in 
the unique close living conditions aboard ships." [d. at 811 n.22. The affidavit empha-
sized the debilitating effects that having homosexuals in the Navy would produce, in-
cluding undue influence arising from "emotional relationships with other homosexuals" 
and the inability of officers or others in authority "to maintain the necessary respect and 
trust from the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality 
.... " [d. The concern was also raised that recruitment might be hindered "should par-
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policies on discharges of homosexuals is that homosexuals are 
threats to combat readiness, security, and morale.215 The Navy 
vehemently asserts that heterosexual sailors despise and detest 
homosexuality, especially in close quarters aboard ships.216 As 
long as the civil courts responsible for reviewing decisions of mil-
itary law accept such facile justifications, instructions such as 
1900.9C217 will serve as a tool for the blanket discharge of homo-
sexuals and suspected homosexuals from the various branches of 
the armed forces. 
v. CONCLUSION 
By presupposing that the majority of sailors despise and de-
test homosexuality and insetting up regulations to formally ex-
press these sentiments, the Department of the Navy fulfills its 
own prophecy. The high command maintains the "purity" of the 
service and increases the likelihood that the Navy will indeed be 
composed largely of homophobic men and women by systemati-
cally discharging homosexuals and suspected homosexuals from 
the Navy. Some of the most lasting lessons of life are taught by 
example. Thus the average enlisted person learns vividly from 
his superiors that homophobia is an admirable and acceptable 
attitude in the United States Navy. 
The question of the role of gay people in the military cannot 
be resolved with one order. At the same time, the military's dog-
ged refusal to evaluate gay servicemembers in terms of merit 
and value to the unit clashes violently with the egalitarian tradi-
tions and ideals that our armed forces popularly are supposed to 
represent. The homosexual's battle for acceptance has seen 
many victories in civilian society; by contrast, in the armed 
forces, his fate is usually sealed unless he can prove himself ab-
solutely vital to his unit, and even that is no guarantee. 
ents become concerned with their children associating with individuals who are incapa-
ble of maintaining high moral standards," since "[a] homosexual might force his desires 
upon others or attempt to do so. This would certainly be disruptive." Id. 
215. SEC/NA V Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216, quoted 
in Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. 
216. Beller, 632 F.2d at 811 n.22. See supra note 214 for relevant discussion. 
217. SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978); Joint Appendix at 216. See 
supra text accompanying note 4 for relevant language. 
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Apart from the considerations of the utility of homosexual 
servicemembers (which can obviously only be done on an indi-
vidual basis), there is the larger question of the right to privacy. 
Simply put, is the armed forces' blanket power to discharge men 
and women because of their sexual preferences reconcilable with 
the constitutional right to privacy? In cases of incompatibility, 
of course, it is patently obvious which enactment must change or 
give way. 
The military is not immune to the problems and controver-
sies of the real world. The continuing separation and persecution 
of a large and important group in our military can only breed 
more intolerance and make the armed forces less representative 
of the society it defends. Diversity (and yes, quality) must of 
necessity suffer when otherwise exemplary men and women are 
purged from the ranks of the military simply because of their 
sexual orientation. ·As long as this "knee-jerk" reaction to homo-
sexuals in the military persists, the sad and degrading spectacle 
of discharges under protest will continue to haunt us. Like Gen-
eral MacArthur's "old soldiers," gay soldiers never die; and 
neither will they fade away. 
Robert A. Dalby* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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